Sunday, May 3, 2009

Somalia Pirates, We!

Most of their rhetoric still reflects their vigilante roots: the bands have names such as “The Somali Marines” and “The Somali Coast Guard.”

On 25 September 2008, the Belize-flagged Ukrainian cargo ship MV Faina was hijacked by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden. The ship allegedly contained thirty-three refurbished Soviet tanks and an arsenal of automatic weapons, with a total value in excess of US$30 million. As the world powers struggle to find a way to deal with the Somali piracy problem, one voice that has been notably absent in the whole debacle is that of the Somali people. For an eloquent introduction to this perspective, please watch Somali-Canadian rapper K’naan’s interview with Hardknock.tv:



Accusations similar to those made by K’naan are seldom addressed in the international media—in fact, among the most accurate portrayals of the Somali pirate issue is a recent episode of South Park. The purpose of this post is thus to introduce the piracy problem and explain why it will persist for the foreseeable future.

Historically, Somalia’s lucrative tuna fishery has been its staple industry. In the absence of a state apparatus to patrol Africa’s longest national coastline, foreign fishing vessels began plundering Somali waters in the mid-1990s. Although their mere presence is a violation of international law, Somalis were particularly incensed by their use of illegal fishing methods, their dumping toxic waste, and their attacks on local fishing boats. The foreign ships come from a myriad of countries including France, Spain, Korea and Taiwan; together, they steal an estimated $300 million worth of fish annually.

Somali fishermen formed vigilante groups in response, which attacked foreign vessels and extracted “fines” for illegal fishing. As fish stocks declined, the vigilantes quickly learned that merchant ships provided much more lucrative ransoms than fishing boats. Various warlords also got involved, giving impunity to loyal pirate bands, selling fishing licenses to foreign vessels, and paying pirates to disrupt their rivals’ shipments of arms and food aid.

The level of piracy ebbed and flowed over the next decade as warlords with different loyalties struggled for power. Attacks skyrocketed in early 2007 after the government headed by the Islamic Courts Union was overthrown by a U.S.-backed Ethiopian force, ending the brief period of law and order that existed under the popular Islamist regime. In recent months the pirates have become increasingly bold, attacking larger ships further from shore with more advanced weaponry. Nevertheless, most of their rhetoric still reflects their vigilante roots: the bands have names such as “The Somali Marines” and “The Somali Coast Guard.”

It can be argued that some of the captured ships are a greater threat to international security than the pirates themselves. The Faina was carrying weapons that were allegedly destined to re-ignite the conflict in Southern Sudan, while an Iranian vessel hijacked in August 2008 was carrying chemical weapons destined for Eritrea. Although the pirates’ claim to be a benevolent coastal defence force is an exaggeration, they are nevertheless (at least accidentally) performing a security function that is usually reserved for government.

Piracy is a violation of international law, just like illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste. But international law fails to deal with these problems in Somalia because its primary means of enforcement is self-help. According this this doctrine, the Somali state is responsible for combating piracy and illegal fishing in Somali waters, while flag states are responsible for defending their ships from pirates in international waters. The former responsibilities are neglected because Somalia is a failed state, while the latter is neglected because no flag state is willing to take the burden of securing the high seas. How does the international community intend to resolve this problem?

The short answer is that it doesn’t. Since the capture of the MV Faina made international headlines, naval forces from Canada, the U.S., Denmark, Britain, France, and Russia have begun patrolling the region. They face a nearly impossible task, akin to a dozen or so police cruisers patrolling the entire province of Alberta. This is no secret to the Navy brass: pirate patrols are seen as a training exercise, an opportunity for sailors to gain real-world combat experience. Like the vast majority of hijacked ships, the Faina was released only after a multi-million dollar ransom was paid in February.

The real losers in the game, however, are the Somali people. Their suffering and vulnerability first exploited by the whole world for over a decade, they have now been reduced to practice targets for baby-faced Western seamen. Until a semblance of order is re-established on land, this embarrassing exercise will continue unabated.